Demographic Decline: The Real Population Crisis
By Matthew Ferguson
Following decades of rapid expansion and warnings of an overpopulation timebomb, one would be forgiven for assuming the world’s population is multiplying dangerously out of control. Indeed, the total population may still be growing – but the fact is that timebomb ticks the other way, towards dangerous demographic decline.
Outside of Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia, barely a handful of countries produce enough children even to sustain population levels. In regions like Southern & Eastern Europe and East Asia, demographic decline is acutely underway, with the Total Fertility Rate (the average number of children born per woman of childbearing age) well below the ‘replacement rate’ of 2.[1] South Korea’s TFR is a startling 0.78 and keeps dropping. Although for now the world continues to grow on the strength of Africa, the rest of the planet shares the same fate: demographic decline and ageing societies. These mark the real population crisis.
Ageing societies mean fewer and fewer workers but more and more elderly people. The implications are stark: depleting tax revenues, fewer generators of goods, strained social services, pressure on intergenerational relationships; meanwhile, greater expenditure on health and social care, spiralling public debt, increased loneliness, and much more. Short of syphoning workers en masse from other nations – many of which will be suffering decline themselves1 – the majority of countries face decades of disruption: economic, social and relational.
In the UK, the public has not awoken to the demographic factor amidst our wider socio-political malaise. For example, while newspapers rush to blame NHS waiting lists on austerity or Brexit, they seldom account for the fact that there are vastly more older people today requiring care. 1 in 6 Britons were over 65 in 1999; in 2019 it was 1 in 5, and will reach 1 in 4 by 2039.[2] Life expectancy has also soared: British women live 6 more years on average than they did in 1980, while men have gained an extra decade! This only compounds the problem, however, since many medical ailments exacerbate with age. ‘Healthspan’ has not kept up with lifespan. And Britain is one of the better performers amongst economically developed countries, with a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 1.6.
Yet Britain’s complacency is not shared by countries like Italy and Japan, who have allocated substantial resources towards stemming decline. Till now, alas, to little effect: Japan’s population has fallen by 5 million since 2010, with the prime minister despairing that the nation is “on the brink of not being able to maintain social functions.”[3]
Globally, there are broadly two policy approaches towards demographic decline: ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’. The conservative approach involves boosting a country’s native population through incentivising women to be stay-at-home mothers. This usually involves tax cuts, debt forgiveness and free fertility treatment, while often involving restrictions on immigration and abortion/contraception.
This approach has most famously been adopted by Hungary, but also by Poland and (to some extent) China.
Meanwhile, the progressive approach aims at sustaining higher birth rates through reducing financial costs of parenthood and enabling both parents to work. Common policies include lengthy parental leave, gender equality legislation and state-subsidised childcare. The progressive approach is about making parenthood – especially motherhood – compatible with a career. It is championed in Scandinavia, with elements also present in Japan and Western Europe more generally.
Yet neither the conservative nor the progressive approach has produced success. Scandinavia has seen sustained TFR declines since 2010, with rates between 1.4-1.7. Even Denmark, long the holdout, now follows suit: its 1.55 TFR in 2022 lags well below the replacement rate. Meanwhile, although Hungary’s muscular approach did heave births from 1.2-1.6 in a decade (costing 5 percent of GDP annually), it has begun to dip in the 2020s. Encouraging, but not good enough, and a far cry from the elusive 2.1 needed to avoid decline.
The common error in both approaches is the framing of falling birthrates as primarily a financial or material problem. ‘Here’s the cheque, now go forth and multiply’. To clarify, such subsidies are welcome where childcare and housing costs encumber young couples. Yet their effect will always be limited, no matter how generous, because they do little to counteract the cultural and ideological forces which undermine childbearing. Forces like environmentalism, anti-natalism and radical individualism have dampened the desire, and even the cultural acceptability, of having children.[4]
Although material factors drove population expansion in the 20th century, the fight against decline in the 21st lies in cultural values. Demographer Paul Morland observes “a decoupling of population and economics”, with “cultural and personal preferences rather than economic factors increasingly shaping demography…”[5] Reversing demographic decline requires grappling with the influences which discourage and complicate family formation.
It is worth examining the one country which has escaped the rut of decline: Israel, and more specifically Israeli Jews. Despite Jewish TFR stagnating to 2.6 between 1960-1990, it has now recovered to 3.1 – far and away the highest amongst OECD countries. Ultra-orthodox families have contributed to this increase, but even secular Jews have children above the replacement rate. This rise has coincided with Israel’s transition into an advanced economy, with high female employment. Although Israel is something of a demographic enigma, the following have been regarded as influential to its success: community support for families, geographic proximity of grandparents, and an unashamedly pro-natalist culture.
The solution, then? Cultivating cultures which promote families (big families!) and facilitating support networks of extended families within local communities. Of course, alleviating financial pressures is important. But young couples must be assured that having children is both feasible and fulfilling, and that they are not isolated but can depend on the help of neighbours and relatives. Governments can play a role in guiding such change; but ultimately, change must come from the bottom up, from communities. It is perhaps no coincidence that many churches’ biggest community presence is in crèche ministries – imagine a whole country similarly dedicated towards celebrating and supporting families! As the prophet foretold in his vision of God’s new creation:
“Old men and old women shall again sit in the streets of Jerusalem, each with staff in hand because of great age. And the streets of the city shall be full of boys and girls playing in its streets.” (Zechariah 8:4-5)
Indeed, it may be in Jerusalem’s cobbled streets that we find our answers to demographic decline.
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[1] Consider Bulgaria, which has lost over a quarter of its population since 1980, mainly due to migration to other EU countries. Many emigrants are educated professionals or key workers. Beneficiary countries, like Germany and the UK, often neglect the plight of countries left behind. The UK – in violation of international restrictions – persists in recruiting medical staff from countries like Ghana, which has a dire shortage of practitioners. See the following: Britain is a parasite on poor countries by poaching their doctors and nurses | The Independent
[2] Overview of the UK population - Office for National Statistics (ons.gov.uk)
[3] Japan's population fell by 800,000 last year as demographic crisis accelerates | CNN
[4] The present author explored ethical implications of these forces in a previous paper, which can be found here: Too many people on Planet Earth? Family size and new ethical considerations for Christians  - Cambridge Papers
[5] Paul Morland, Tomorrow’s People – The Future of Humanity in Ten Numbers, 2022, pages 7 and 12
The views and opinions expressed above are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Jubilee Centre or its trustees.
